Abstract. Information flow properties express the capability for an agent to infer information about secret behaviours of a partially observable system. In a language-theoretic setting, where the system behaviour is described by a language, we define the class of rational information flow properties (RIFP), where observers are modeled by finite transducers, acting on languages in a given family L. This leads to a general decidability criterion for the verification problem of RIFPs on L, implying PSPACE-completeness for this problem on regular languages. We show that most trace-based information flow properties studied up to now are RIFPs, including those related to selective declassification and conditional anonymity. As a consequence, we retrive several existing decidability results that were obtained by ad-hoc proofs.
Introduction
Motivations. Generic models for information flow properties aim at expressing, in a uniform setting, the various capabilities of observers to infer information from partially observable systems. These models provide a description of the system behaviour, a parametric description of the observation by the environment and the secret parts of the system, and a security criterion. A security property is an instantiation of such a model, with the goal of avoiding a particular information flow. Generic models have been thoroughly investigated, for instance in [Man00, FG01, BKMR08] . They propose various classifications and comparisons of security properties, either for transition systems or directly for traces. In the case of transition systems [FG01, BKMR08] , the branching structure permits to express security properties as equivalences like weak or strong (bi-)simulations. For trace-based models, properties are stated as relations between languages, also called security predicates in [Man00] .
In addition to classification, an important question about security properties concern their verification: given a system S and a security property P , does S satisfy P ? Since [FG01], much attention has been given to such questions for various classes of systems (or their sets of traces) and security properties [BKMR08,DHRS11,CDM12,DFK + 12,BD12,MY14,CFK + 14]. This is the problem we consider in this work, for a subclass of trace-based information flow properties.
Contributions. We first introduce the class of Rational Information Flow Properties (RIFP), in a language-theoretic setting. In this class, observations are modeled by rational transducers, called here rational observers. For a language L in some family of languages L, an RIFP is then defined as an inclusion relation L 1 ⊆ L 2 , where L 1 and L 2 are obtained from L by inductively applying rational observers, unions and intersections. This mechanism produces the set of properties RIF (L), and a generic decidability result can be stated for the verification problem of these properties. In the particular case of the family Reg of regular languages, generated by finite automata (also called labelled transition systems), we obtain a PSPACE-complete verification problem for the class RIF (Reg). We then proceed to show that this result subsumes most existing decidability results for security properties on regular languages, thus establishing the pertinency of our model. This involves expressing properties in our formalism by designing suitable rational observers. We first consider the particular case where observations are functions and we show that opacity properties with regular secrets are RIFPs. To illustrate the expressiveness of RIFPs, we introduce a subclass of functional rational observers that we call rational Orwellian observers and show that several properties including intransitive non-interference and selective intransitive non-interference for a language L ∈ L are in RIF (L). We also reduce their verification to the verification of opacity w.r.t. Orwellian observers. These observers are more powerful than those considered so far in literature as they model not only observers constrained to a fixed a priori interpretation of unobservable events (static observers) or even to observers able to base this interpretation on observation of previous events (dynamic observers), but also able to re-interpret past unobservable events on the base of subsequent observation. We finally consider general observers and we show that all Mantel's Basic Security Predicates (BSPs) are RIFPs. Finally, we illustrate the applicability of our framework by providing the first formal specification for conditional anonymity guaranteeing anonymity of agents unless revocation (for instance, the identity of an agent discovered to be dishonest can be revealed).
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Rational Information flow properties are defined in Section 2, with the associated decidability results. RIFPs w.r.t. rational observation functions are investigated in Section 3: rational opacity properties as RIFP are presented in 3.1, Orwellian observers in 3.2 and their application to intransitive non-interference and selective intransitive non-interference in 3.3. RIFPs w.r.t. general rational observation relations are investigated in 4: BSPs as RIFPs are presented in 4.1 and an application of general rational observation relation to conditional anonymity is presented in 4.2. In Section 5, we discuss related work and we conclude in Section 6.
Rational Information flow properties
We briefly recall the notions of finite automata and finite transducers before defining rational information flow properties.
Automata and transducers
The set of natural numbers is denoted by N and the set of words over a finite alphabet A is denoted by A * , with ε for the empty word and A + = A * \ {ε}. The length of a word w is written |w| and for any a ∈ A, |w| a is the number of occurrences of a in w. A language is a subset of A * .
Finite Labelled Transition Systems.
A finite labelled transition system (LTS or automaton for short), over a finite set Lab of labels, is a tuple A = Q, I, ∆, F , where Q is a finite set of states, I ⊆ Q is the subset of initial states, ∆ ⊆ Q × Lab × Q is a finite transition relation and F ⊆ Q is a set of final states. Note that Lab can be an alphabet but also a (subset of a) monoid. Given two states q, q ′ ∈ Q, a path from q to q ′ with label u, written as q u −→q ′ , is a sequence of transitions q a1 −→q 1 , q 1 a2 −→q 2 , · · · , q n−1 an −→q ′ , with a i ∈ Lab and q i ∈ Q, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, such that u = a 1 · · · a n . The path is accepting if q ∈ I and q ′ ∈ F , and the language of A, denoted by L(A), is the set of labels of accepting paths. A regular language over an alphabet A is a subset of A * accepted by a finite LTS over the set of labels A.
Finite Transducers. A finite transducer (or transducer for short) is a finite LTS T with set of labels Lab ⊆ A * × B * for two alphabets A and B. A label (u, v) ∈ A * × B * is also written as u|v. The subset L(T ) of A * × B * is a rational relation [Sak09] from A * to B * . The transducer T is said to realize the relation L(T ) (see Fig. 1 for basic examples of transducers).
Given a rational relation R, we write
* , possibly extended to subsets of A * or B * respectively, and dom(R) = {u ∈ A * | ∃v ∈ B * , (u, v) ∈ R} for the domain of R. The relation R is complete if dom(R) = A * , it is a function if for each u ∈ dom(R), R(u) contains a single element v ∈ B * . For a subset P of A * , the identity relation {(u, u) | u ∈ P } on A * × A * is denoted by Id P . The composition of rational relations R 1 on A * × B * and R 2 on B * × C * , denoted by R 1 R 2 (from left to right) or by R 2 • R 1 (from right to left), is the rational relation on
). The family of regular languages is closed under rational relations [Ber79].
Rational observers
Information flow properties are related to what an agent can learn from a given system. In a language-based setting, the behavior of the system is described by a language L over some alphabet A, and some function O associates with each w ∈ L its observation O(w) visible by the agent. We generalize the notion of observation by defining O as a relation on A * × B * for some alphabet B, but we restrict O to be a rational relation.
Definition 1 (Rational observer). A rational observer is a rational relation
As pointed out in [DHRS11] , a large amount of information flow properties of a language L are expressed as relations of the form op 1 (L) ⊆ op 2 (L), for some language theoretic operations op 1 and op 2 . Actually, we show below that op 1 and op 2 are often rational relations corresponding to some specific observations of L. Also, we define the class of rational information flow properties as those using rational observers, and positive boolean operations: 
where O is a rational observer.
Hence, from Def. 1, we recover information flow properties of L of the form O 1 (L) ⊆ O 2 (L) for two rational observers, as a particular case. However it has to be noted that Def. 1 does not reduce to these inclusions since rational relations are not closed under intersection [Ber79] . Given a family of languages L, we define RIF (L) as the set of RIFPs for languages in L. We immediately have the following general result: In particular, the class Reg of regular languages satisfies the conditions above, with a PSPACE-complete inclusion problem. We then have:
Proof. It follows from the remark above that the problem is in PSPACE. For PSPACE-hardness, recall that for a language K, the relation O K defined by O K (w) = {w} ∩ K is a rational observer if (and only if) K is a regular language [Sak09] . Let L 1 and L 2 be two regular languages, and let O L1 , O L2 be the two corresponding relations, then for
⊓ ⊔ This corollary subsumes many existing decidability results for IF properties. The rest of the paper is devoted to establish reductions of some of these to the RIF (Reg) verification problem.
RIF properties with rational functions
In this section, we consider the generic model of opacity introduced in [BKMR08] for transition systems. Opacity is parametrized with observation functions, that are classified in [BKMR08] as static, dynamic or Orwellian to reflect the computational power of the observer. In a static observation, actions are always interpreted in the same way. It is defined as a morphism and hence, it is a rational function. A particular case of static observer is the projection π B from A * into B * for a subalphabet B of A, so that π B (a) = a if a ∈ B and π B (a) = ε otherwise. In a dynamic observation function, interpretation of the current action depends on the sequence of actions observed so far and hence, it is also a rational function.
Example 1. In Fig. 1 (where all states are final states), the left hand side depicts a transducer realizing the projection from {a, b} * onto {b} * while the right hand side depicts a transducer realizing the following dynamic observation function (translated from [CDM12] ): The first occurrence of the first action is observed, then nothing is observed until the first occurrence of the second action (b if the trace begins with a and a otherwise) and everything is observed in clear as soon as this second action occurs that is, O(aa * bu) = abu and O(bb * au) = bau for any u ∈ {a, b} * . In Orwellian observation functions, the current observation depends not only on the prefix of actions observed so far but also on the complete trace. It reflects the capability of the observer to use subsequent knowledge to re-interpret past actions. In the rest of this section we will study opacity w.r.t. rational Orwellian observers.
Opacity w.r.t. rational functions
In its original setting, opacity is related to a language L ⊆ A * modelling the behaviour of a system, a function O from A * to B * and in addition, a predicate ϕ given as a subset of L, describing a secret. Two words w and w
. The secret ϕ is opaque in L for O if for any word in ϕ, there is another word in L \ ϕ such that w and w ′ are observationally equivalent. Hence, ϕ is opaque if and only if O(ϕ) ⊆ O(L \ ϕ), which we take as definition when O is a rational function:
The information flow deduced by an observer when the system is not opaque is captured by the notion of secret disclosure: A word w ∈ L discloses the secret
We have: Proposition 2. Rational opacity properties on languages in some family L for regular secrets belong to RIF (L).
Proof. As already seen in the proof of Corollary 1, intersection with a regular set K is a rational observation O K . Since the secret ϕ is regular, opacity of ϕ in
Non-interference and weak and strong anonymity have been shown to reduce to opacity w.r.t. suitable observers (see [BKMR08] ). In [CDM12] , PSPACEhardness is established for opacity of regular secrets for regular languages w.r.t. static and dynamic observers.
Rational Orwellian observers
In the sequel, we denote the disjoint union by ∪ · . In our context, Orwellian observation functions from [BKMR08] are realized by rational Orwellian observers:
Definition 4 (Rational Orwellian Observer). A rational Orwellian observer is a rational function, given as a disjoint union of functions:
Note that O is a function because the domains of the views are disjoint. We simply call these functions Orwellian observers for short, since there is no ambiguity in our context. The terminology Orwellian comes from the ability of the observer to somehow see in the future, as illustrated in the following example. Hence, the observer interpretation of the current event depends on the last event of the trace. If it is a then O interprets the trace as its projection over {b} and the other way around, if it is b then it interprets the trace as its projection over {a}.
Despite its observational power, this observer is not able to deduce whether the first event in the trace in L = (a + b)(a * + b * )(a + b) is an a. Indeed, let ϕ = a(a * + b * )(a + b) be the secret, corresponding to the set of traces in L with a as the first event. Then ϕ is opaque w.r.t. O in L. To see this, if a secret trace w is observed, examine what O can deduce from this observation.
-If w ends with an a then O(w) = b n for some n ≥ 0 but b n a ∈ ϕ is also observed by b n . -If w ends with a b then O(w) = a n for some n ≥ 0 but ba n b ∈ ϕ is also observed by a n .
Example 3 (Static and dynamic observers).
Static and dynamic observations are of course special cases of Orwellian observers, where O consists of a single complete view. Note that static and dynamic observations preserve prefixes while it is not necessarily the case for Orwellian observations (see examples 2 and 4). the projection on V unless D, and defined as a mapping π V,D :
Example 4 (Intransitive non-interference). Let
Proof. The function π V,D is a sum of two views: 
It has been shown in [MY14] that a language L satisfies intransitive noninterference (INI) if and only if ϕ
This can be generalized as follows, showing that many non-interference like properties reduce to opacity w.r.t. Orwellian observers. Proof. Corollary 1 implies that the problem is in PSPACE. For the PSPACEhardness, it suffices to observe that dynamic or static observers are particular Orwellian observers for which the problem is already PSPACE-hard.
⊓ ⊔
In the next paragraph, we show that the observation function defined for selective declassification is an Orwellian observer. 
Selective declassification
, for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n} with the convention V σ,n = V , and the projections π σ,i : A * → V * σ,i for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
For a given σ = d 1 . . . d n ∈ Σ(D), the set W σ contains the words w in A * where the set of all downgrading actions is precisely {d 1 , . . . , d n } and such that the last occurrence of d i precedes the last occurrence of d i+1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Note that the family of all these sets {W σ , σ ∈ Σ} form a partition of A * . Besides, the projection π σ,i observes in clear any confidential event in ∪ n j=i+1 C(d j ), in addition to the visible events in V and the declassifying events from σ. Now the property called INISD in [BD12] can be stated in our general context for a language L as follows: For any σ ∈ Σ(D) and for any word 
Since the family {W σ , σ ∈ Σ} is a partition of A * , the family {L ∩ W σ , σ ∈ Σ} is a partition of L and the result follows. Each view O σ is idempotent and the partitionning also ensures that O SD itself is idempotent. As a consequence, proposition 4 applies here.
Remark 1. Also note that a secret ϕ is opaque for a language L w.r.t. O SD if and only if for all σ ∈ Σ(D), ϕ ∩ W σ is opaque for L ∩ W σ w.r.t. O σ . Indeed, the result again holds because the family {L ∩ W σ , σ ∈ Σ} is a partition of L: for all σ ∈ Σ(D), O σ (W σ ) ⊆ W σ , we have that ϕ is opaque for L w.r.t. O SD if and only if for all σ ∈ Σ(D),
Like before, for regular languages, decidability of INISD as well as opacity under O SD , are consequences of corollary 1 and proposition 6 above. This property is studied in [BD12] for the prefix languages of (unbounded) labelled Petri nets. This family is closed under intersection, inverse morphisms and alphabetical morphisms, hence it is also closed under rational transductions (by Nivat's theorem [Ber79]), but it has an undecidable inclusion problem. A very nice proof is given in [BD12] for the decidability of the INISD property: it relies on the decidability of the inclusion problem for the particular case of free nets (where all transitions have distinct labels, different from ε).
The following example (inspired from [BD12] ) tries to explain the essence of selective declassification.
Example 5 (The Dining Raptors).
A circuit followed by a herd of goats is divided in three sections. Each section is guarded by a gate. When gate i is open, goats ) is open, a raptor can leave the den and hide around gate i after opening it and closing gate i + 1 (mod 3) to increase chance of success. When a raptor is embushed near a section and there is a goat in this section, the raptor can catch prey and come back to the den.
This scenario is modelled with the transition system
Gate(k) obtained by synchronizing the components depicted in Figure 5 on the complementary actions. Goats' move from gate i to gate i + 1 (mod 3) is modelled with visible action l 1 , raptors' embush action at section i, with the confidential action h i and the raptors' catch action in section i, by the declassification action
comes down to absence of information the goats can get from environment about the moment they will be caught until this happens. Hence there is no strategy that they can oppose to the raptors. In the case where initially goats are in section 2 and gates 1 and 3 are opened, as shown in Figure 5 , L(DR(n, m)) is not opaque w.r.t. ϕ DR since l 3 l 1 h 2 l 2 reveals the secret (h 2 l 3 l 1 l 2 , l 3 h 2 l 1 l 2 and l 3 l 1 h 2 l 2 are the only traces observed as l 3 l 1 l 2 ) and this, for any number of raptors and goats. 
RIF properties with full rational relations
In this section, we first revisit Basic Security Predicates (BSP) presented in [Man00, Man01] and used as building blocks of the Mantel's generic security model. In the second part, we investigate anonymity properties.
Basic Security Predicates
For BSPs, the alphabet A is partitioned into A = V ∪ · C ∪ · N , where V is the set of visible events, C is the set of confidential events and N is a set of internal events. Informally, a BSP for a given language L over A, is an implication stating that for any word w in L satisfying some restriction condition, there exists a word w ′ also in L which is observationnally equivalent to w and which fulfills some closure condition describing the way w ′ is obtained from w by adding or removing some confidential events. The conditions are sometimes parametrized by an additional set X ⊆ A of so-called admissible events. We prove:
Proposition 7. Any BSP over languages in some family L belongs to RIF (L).
Proof. The proof mainly consists in exhibiting rational observers together with an inclusion relation such that a language L satisfies a given BSP if and only if this relation holds. We give the general idea with several examples. For any B ⊆ A, we write B = A \ B. First observe that, starting from some inclusion relation O 1 (L) ⊆ O 2 (L) for rational observers O 1 and O 2 , ignoring events from N reduces to composing both sides with π N . This is simply done by adding loops labeled by n|ε, for all n ∈ N , on all states of the tranducers realizing O 1 and O 2 over V ∪ · C. This operation corresponds to variants of the properties.
The simplest predicate called Strict Removal of events (SR) corresponds
to a projection:
, since the composition of π C and π N produces π V . 2. We now turn to predicates with stepwise deletion of events. A language L satisfies SD (Strict Deletion of events) if for any w = w 1 cw 2 ∈ L, with c ∈ C and π C (w 2 ) = ε, then w 1 w 2 ∈ L. As noted in [DHRS11] , this property is equivalent to l-del(L) ⊆ L, where l-del is the function associating with a word w the word l-del(w) obtained from w by deleting the last confidential event. This function is realized by the transducer in Figure 6 left. The observation itself is described in [Man00] as a recursive operation: starting from w = w 0 c 1 w 1 c 2 . . . w p−1 c p w p with w i ∈ C * for 0 ≤ i ≤ p, the words obtained by successively removing all confidential actions from the right to the left of w must also belong to L. This corresponds to applying the star operation to l-del (for the composition of relations), resulting in O del = ∪ k≥0 l-del k , which is not a function. While the star operation does not necessarily preserve rational relations [Sak09] , in this case, O del is realized by the transducer in Figure 6 right. 
In this case, only the suffixes w 2 and w ′ 2 following the last confidential event can differ on internal events from N . The corresponding observation relation O BSD is defined by associating with a word w = w 1 cw 2 such that π C (w 2 ) = ε, all words obtained from w by removing c and replacing w 2 by some w Fig. 7 right, with L satisfies F CD if and only if O F CD (L) ⊆ L. 3. Finally, the last class concerns stepwise insertion of events. A language L satisfies SI (Strict insertion of events) if for any w = w 1 w 2 ∈ L, with π C (w 2 ) = ε, and for any c ∈ C, we have w 1 cw 2 ∈ L. The corresponding relation l-ins (which is also not a function) such that L satisfies SI iff l-ins(L) ⊆ L, is realized by a transducer similar to the one in Fig. 6 left, where the middle labels c|ε, c ∈ C are replaced by ε|c, c ∈ C. The non strict (I), the backward (BSI) and the correctable (F CI) variants are obtained similarly.
The remaining four predicates concern insertion with respect to admissible events. For a given subset X of A, a language L satisfies Strict insertion of X-admissible events (SIA X ) if for any w = w 1 w 2 ∈ L such that π C (w 2 ) = ε and there are some w 3 ∈ A * and c ∈ C with w 3 c ∈ L and π X (w 1 ) = π X (w 3 ), we have w 1 cw 2 ∈ L. In this case, recall that the left quotient of language M ′ by language M is defined by
For a fixed regular language M , the left quotient by M and the concatenation by M are rational relations [Ber79]. For each c ∈ C, we consider the two following rational relations:
-l-ins c is the variant of l-ins where the single fixed letter c is inserted,
Similar relations hold for the variants (IA X ), (BSIA X ) and (F CIA X ), hence these four cases are slightly different from the previous ones.
⊓ ⊔
In [DHRS11] , the decidability results for all 14 BSPs on regular languages are obtained by ad-hoc proofs establishing that regularity is preserved by the various op 1 , op 2 operations. These include auxiliary functions on languages (like mark, unmark, etc.) that are unnecessary in our setting. Actually, we show how decidability of BSPs is an immediate consequence of corollary 1 and proposition 7 above. The more difficult case of pushdown systems (generating prefix-closed context-free languages) is also investigated in [DHRS11] : Although contextfree languages are closed under rational transductions, they are not closed under intersection and the inclusion problem is undecidable for context-free languages [Ber79]. Finally, several undecidability results are presented in [DHRS11] . In particular, they exhibit an information flow property called Weak Non Inference (WNI) shown to be undecidable even for regular languages. Hence, WNI cannot be expressed neither as a conjunction of BSPs, and as matter of fact, neither as an RIFP. Also, in order to get decidable cases, authors had to restrict the languages and/or the class of properties like reducing the size of the alphabet (card(V ) ≤ 1 and card(C) ≤ 1).
Conditional anonymity
Conditional or escrowed anonymity is concerned with the revocation of the guarantee, under well-defined conditions, to which an agent agrees, that his identification w.r.t. a particular (non-secret) action will remain secret and in such case, conditional anonymity guarantees the unlinkability of revoked users in order to guarantee anonymity to "legitimate" agents [DS08] . As suggested in [BKMR08] , Orwellian observation can be used to model conditional anonymity but [BKMR08] contains neither a definition of such a property, nor any investigation of its decidability. We close the gap in this paper.
The alphabet is partitioned into A = V ∪ · P ∪ · R where P is the set of actions performed by anonymous participants, V is the set of visible actions and R is the set of anonymity revocation actions, such that for each participant corresponds a dedicated revocation action r allowing to reveal the subset P (r) of all its anonymous actions. Hence the sets P (r) are mutually disjoint.
In [SS96], definitions of weak and strong anonymity are given in the setting of the process algebra CSP. A language is strongly anonymous (SA) if it is stable under any "perturbation" of anonymous actions where an anonymous action in P can be replaced by any other element of P . It is weakly anonymous (WA) if it is stable under any permutation on the set of anonymous actions. For a finite set Z, we denote by S Z the set of all permutations on Z. We first have:
Proposition 8. Weak and strong anonymity on languages in L belong to RIF (L).
Proof. For these two properties, the subalphabet R of revocation actions is empty. We express the properties in our language-based setting, similarly as in [BKMR08] .
A language L is strongly anonymous w.r.t. A language L is weakly anonymous w.r.t.
and O α is the morphism which applies the permutation α on letters of P :
O α (a) = α(a) if a ∈ P and O α (a) = a otherwise. With any σ ⊆ R, we associate:
, the set of words w in A * where the set of revocation actions appearing in w is σ, -P σ = P \ · r∈σ P (r), the set of actions of legitimate agents.
We denote by 2 R the powerset of R and remark that here also, the sets W σ for σ ∈ 2 R form a partition of A * . In order to provide at any moment strong (weak) anonymization to legitimate agents, we define conditional anonymity as follows:
Definition 5. With the notations above, a language L on V ∪ · P ∪ · R is:
Now we have:
Proposition 9. Weak and strong conditional anonymity on languages in L belong to RIF (L).
Proof. We build rational observers, with a view-like component for each possible subset σ of revoked users, corresponding to O SA (resp. O W A ) localized to W σ , i.e. revocation actions are those in σ, anonymous actions are restricted to P σ and visible actions are extended to V ∪ · · r∈σ P (r): ) and shows how opacity can be instantiated to important security properties in computer systems and communication protocols, namely anonymity and secrecy. In [SH11], the authors define the notion of K-step opacity where the system remains state-based opaque in any step up to depth-k observations that is, any observation disclosing the secret has a length greater than k. Two methods are proposed for verifying K-step opacity. All these verification problems can be uniformly reduced to the RIFP verification problem.
In [FG01], the authors provide decision procedures for a large class of tracebased security properties that can all be reduced to the RIFP verification problem for regular languages. In [MZ07], decision procedures are given for tracebased properties like non-deducibility, generalized non-interference and forward correctability. The PSPACE-completeness results for these procedures can be reduced to our results.
Concerning intransitive information flow (IIF), non-interference (NI) and intransitive non-interference (INI) for deterministic Mealy machines have been defined in [Rus92] . In [Pin95], an algorithm is provided for INI. A formulation of INI in the context of non-deterministic LTSs is given in [Mul00] , in the form of a property called admissible interference (AI), which is verified by reduction to a stronger version of NI. This property, called strong non-deterministic noninterference (SNNI) in [FG01], is applied to N finite transition systems where N is the number of downgrading transitions of the original system. This problem was also reduced to the opacity verification problem w.r.t. Orwellian projections in [MY14] . In [BPR04], various notions of trace-based INI declassification properties are considered and compared. In contrast, our generic model is instantiable to a much larger class of IIF properties.
In [vdM07] , the author has argued that Rushby's definition of security for intransitive policies suffers from some flaw, and proposed some stronger variations. The considered flaw relies to the fact that, if u ∈ W d1 and v ∈ W d2 , that is u (resp. v) declassifies only h 1 ∈ H(d 1 ) (resp. h 2 ∈ H(d 2 )), then the shuffle of u and v resulting of their concurrent interaction will reveal the order in which h 1 and h 2 have been executed. The proof techniques used in this paper for deciding the RIFP verification problem relies on their end-to-end execution semantics and hence does not address this problem.
Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a language-theoretic model for trace-based information flow properties, the RIFPs where observers are modelled by rational transducers. Given a family L of languages, our model provides a generic decidability result to the RIF (L) verification problem: Given L ∈ L and a security property P in RIF(L), does L satisfy P ? When L is the class Reg of regular languages, the problem is shown PSPACE-complete. This result subsumes most decidability results for finite systems. In order to prove that, we have shown that opacity properties and Mantel's BSPs, two major generic models for trace-based IF properties, are RIFPs. We have illustrated the expressiveness of our model by showing that the verification problem of INI and INISD can be reduced to the verification problem of opacity w.r.t. a subclass of rational observers called rational Orwellian observers. Finally we have illustrated the applicability of our framework by providing the first formal specification of conditional anonymity.
As far as we know, the only decidability results of trace-based security properties for infinite systems are presented in [BDG11, BD12, DHRS11] . Hence, the approaches of the present paper and [BD12, DHRS11] lead to the question (which is so far open, to the best of our knowledge) of which infinite systems have a decidable verification problem for BSPs. Another line for future work would be to investigate the links between our framework and the logics studied in [ 
